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Abstract
This paper introduces a psychological notion of categorization into economics and
derives its implications for economic decision making. We show, using a tractable model
of social cognition, that a decision maker in (eÆciently) assigning past experiences to
categories, will sort experiences of interaction with larger (majority) groups more nely
than experiences with smaller (minority) groups. We then apply the model to understand
simple forms of discrimination and social identity. It is shown that discrimination in
hiring can result from such cognitive processes even when there is no malevolent taste
to do so and workers' qualications are fully observable. The model also provides a
framework that is equipped to investigate the social psychological concept of identity,
where identity is viewed as self-categorization.
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Categorical Cognition: A psychological model of
categories and identication in decision making

Roland G. Fryer, Jr. Matthew O. Jackson
1 Introduction
\People will be prejudiced so long as they continue to think."
Billig (1985, p.81)
People categorize others in order to eectively navigate their way through the world of
murky social interactions and exchange. Gordon Allport memorably noted, \the human
mind must think with the aid of categories. We cannot possibly avoid this process.
Orderly living depends upon it." To this, most (if not all) psychologists would agree.
Perhaps even more importantly, there is a long tradition in social psychology that treats
stereotyping and prejudice as inevitable consequences of categorization (for example, see
Allport (1954), Hamilton (1981), and Tajfel (1969)). While ideas of categorical thinking
and stereotyping have been at the forefront of social psychology for ve decades, their
potential has yet to be realized in economics.
This paper introduces a notion of categorization into economics and derives its impli-
cation for economic decision making. In particular, based on a wealth of research from
psychology we build a model of social cognition centered on the basic principle that hu-
mans process information with the aid of categories. We derive some basic results about
what such a model implies regarding biases in decision making, and then apply this model
to understand some simple forms of discrimination in economic contexts, including labor
and lending markets, and identity choice; though we envision even broader implications.
A short synopsis of our approach is as follows. We construct a model where a deci-
sion maker stores past experiences in a nite set of bins or \categories." The number
of categories is limited, and so there is some grouping of experiences based on their
likeness. The decision maker, then, forms prototypes for prediction based on some ag-
gregate memory or statistic from each category. When encountering a new situation,

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the decision maker matches the current situation to the most analogous category, and
then makes predictions based on the prototype from that category. We show that an
\eÆcient" categorization (i.e., one that minimizes the total of within category variation)
necessarily lumps less frequent types of experiences into categories that end up being
more heterogeneous. This has implications regarding discrimination. An important in-
sinuation being that interactions with minority groups (which for most decision makers
are necessarily less frequent due to the minority nature of the group) will generally be
sorted more coarsely into categories than interactions with larger groups. In a labor
theoretic example, this means that minorities will not be as nely sorted based on their
investments in human capital, for instance. This in turn provides minorities with less of
an incentive to invest in human capital, which then further reinforces the coarse sorting,
and those minorities who have invested are still not viewed on equal footing with others
who have made similar investments.
This model and the analysis described above also provides another pointed prediction.
Minority group members will benet from congregating together. That is, if they live
in a location with a large fraction of other minorities or apply to schools, rms, etc.,
which are more frequented by other minorities, then they are more likely to interact with
people with suÆciently many experiences with minorities so that minorities are more
nely sorted in memory.
1
This is consistent with interesting patterns of segregation by
race and income, as documented for instance by Jargowsky and Bane (1991).
Our contribution may be described as follows: (1) we develop a formal model of social
cognition based on categorization of memories, (2) we show that such categorization
results in particular biases based on the frequency with which an observer encounters
similar situations, (3) we provide a theoretical basis for the experimental evidence in
social psychology attesting that people tend to characterize others by race (Brewer, 1988;
Bruner, 1957; Fiske and Neuberg, 1990); (4) we show that discrimination can exist in
an environment where there is no taste for discrimination and qualications are fully
observable; (5) we show that this discrimination is unique to minority groups and not
the consequence of some \coordination failure"; and (6) we discuss implications of the
model regarding social identity, which we view as self- categorization.
As we mentioned before, we are certainly not the rst to provide a model of cate-
gorization. In particular, there is a rich literature in psychology on categorization, and
a number of models that have been developed for use in analyzing data to understand
how categorization works (for example, Ashby and Maddox, 1992; Ashby and Waldron,
1999, McKinley and Nosofsky, 1995; Reed, 1972; Rosseel, 2002). However, our analysis
is the rst to provide a model for which one can prove results regarding the properties of
eÆcient categorization; and in particular showing that it necessarily implies dierential
treatment of groups based on their size. This model is thus particularly well-suited to
use in analyzing how categorization results in specic and predictable biases in decision
1
As the president of a major state university indicated, \the best way to teach students that not all
blacks think alike, is to admit more black students so the other students can see that not all blacks think
alike."
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making.
The closest work to ours in the economics literature is that of Mullainathan (2001),
who studies the implications of a model of categorization for the estimation of probabili-
ties. He demonstrates biases in estimating high and low probabilities, and runs of events,
based on the lumpiness common to categorization models. However, Mullainathan's
model is more in the tradition of the probabilistic psychological models referred to above,
where a likelihood is estimated from linking to an established (or in some models, an es-
timated) set of categories. Here instead, we examine how the categories themselves are
built in terms of eÆciently storing information, and how that leads to particular group-
ings of past experiences based on their frequency. As such, the results and applications
have little in common with Mullainathan's (or the previous work in psychology).
Discrimination
Our initial curiosity in the workings of categorization was motivated in thinking about
how people's preferences manifest themselves in discriminatory behavior. Rather than
simply assume preferences for one's own type, the model we develop here provides a
foundation in which such behavior might emerge and persist over time.
Relative to previous theories of discrimination, our contribution can be viewed in
the following manner. There are two main theories of discrimination in the economics
literature: one attributed to a \taste" for discrimination (e.g., Becker, 1957); and one
based on an informational asymmetry between a principal (employer, creditor, etc.) and
an agent (worker, borrower, etc.) (e.g., Arrow (1973)). In the taste framework, agents
from a particular group (say whites) are averse to interacting with another group (say
blacks) because they experience a psychic utility cost. While this may indeed be the
case, there is no discussion of why such taste exists, much less persists.
2
Using a dier-
ent approach, Arrow (1973) contends that labor market discrimination is a result of an
informational asymmetry between employers and workers regarding capital investments
made by the worker. Because of this asymmetry, and employers' initial pessimistic beliefs
about blacks, they set hiring standards higher for blacks. This, however, induces blacks
to invest at a lower rate, which conrms the employers initial pessimism. Discrimination
arises because of multiple equilibria. Therefore, from a purely theoretical point of view,
blacks are just as likely as whites to be disadvantaged (face a high employment standard
and end up with a low investment rate) in equilibrium.
3
The statistical discrimination
literature, therefore, relies on an unspecied equilibrium selection mechanism that some-
how always ensures that the equilibrium is one that is bad for blacks. There are many
2
There is some discussion of this in the sociology literature (see Goman (1963)) and the psychology
literature (see Allport, 1954).
3
Moro and Norman (2002) provide a notable exception. They show that group inequalities can arise
even when the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. Again, however, in
their model whites are just as likely as blacks to be in the disadvantaged group, as the formal results do
not depend on their population proportions.
3
papers in the literatures on discrimination that have followed the seminal contributions
of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973).
4
The model that we outline here provides a theory
of discrimination that brings the past ve decades of progress in social psychology into
a formal decision and game theoretic environment without assuming some a priori taste
for discrimination or any form of informational asymmetry.
Before moving to a full description of the categorization model and our results, we
present a stark example that previews some of the ideas, intuitions, and subtleties in the
general modeling.
2 An Example
Consider a population of employers and a population of workers. The population of
workers consists of a fraction  of \white" workers and 1   of \black" workers, where
 is greater than
1
2
. Thus, the black workers are the \minority" group. Workers come
in two human capital (say education) levels: high and low. So, overall, workers come in
four avors: black-high, black-low, white-high, and white-low. For now, let us assume
that black and white workers are both just as likely to be of high human capital levels
as low. We can represent a worker's type by a vector in f0; 1g
2
, where (0; 0) represents
black-low, (0; 1) represents black-high, (1; 0) represents white-low, and (1; 1) represents
white-high.
Let us suppose that an employer has fewer categories available in her memory than
there are types of people in the world, and start by examining the case where the employer
has three categories available. Suppose also that the employer has interacted with workers
in the past roughly in proportion to their presence in the population.
How might the employer sort the past types that s/he has interacted with into the
categories? Let us suppose that this is done in a way so that the objects (memories
of types of past workers in this case) in the categories are as \similar as possible."
To be more explicit, let us assume that the objects are sorted to minimize the sum
across categories of the total variation about the mean from each category. For instance,
consider a case where  = :9 and the employer has previously interacted with 100 workers
in proportion to their presence in the population. So the employer has interacted with
5 workers of type (0,0); 5 of type (0,1); 45 of type (1,0) and 45 of type (1,1). Let us
assign these to three categories. The most obvious way, and the unique way to minimize
the sum across categories of the total variation about the mean from each category, is to
put all of the type (1,1)'s in one category, all of the type (1,0)'s in another category, and
all of (0,)'s in the third category. This means that the white workers end up perfectly
sorted, but the black workers end up only sorted by race and not by their human capital
level! To get an idea of why this is the optimal sorting, let us examine the total variation
4
See Fryer (2002a) for a recent review of theoretical models of discrimination in the economics liter-
ature.
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(within-categories) that it generates, and compare it to some other possible assignments
to categories.
The variation in category 1 (all (1,1)'s) is 0, the variation in category 2 (all (1,0))'s
is 0, and the variation in category 3 (containing 5  (0,0) and 5  (0,1)) is 10 
1
2
,
for a total variation of 5; where the distance between either type (0,0) or (0,1) and the
category 3 average of (0,
1
2
) is
1
2
and there are ten such objects stored in category 3.
To see why this leads to the least variation, consider another assignment of objects to
categories where the low human capital types were all assigned to one category and the
high human capital types were sorted into two categories (by race). Here the variation in
category 1 (all (1,1)'s) is 0, the variation in category 2 (all (0,1))'s is 0, and the variation
in category 3 (containing 45  (1,0) and 5  (0,0)) is 45  :1 and 5  .9 for a total
variation of 9 (noting that the average in that category is (.9,0)). In total, objects are
further from their category means in the second assignment. This gives us an idea of how
categorization can lead to a sorting where some group members are more coarsely sorted
than others. Note, it is in particular minority group members that are more coarsely
sorted, due to their lower frequency in the population.
This example is consistent with the experimental evidence in social psychology and
neuroscience that agents tend to categorize others by race (Brewer, 1988; Bruner, 1957;
Fiske and Neuberg, 1990). Once we couple this with the observation that prototypes
are important in forming expectations, we can see how discrimination can result. Under
the eÆcient categorization, the prototype for the third category is the average of that
category of (0;
1
2
). This prototype works against the high human capital blacks, as the
expectation from the prototype of their category is lower than their type. It is due
to the fact that the mind of the employer has stored them in a category that we can
label \black" rather than \black-high". This can result in high human capital blacks
not being hired for positions that require high human capital levels, and also in oers
of wages that are below their productivity levels. This form of discrimination is not
malevolent, nor is it derived from some primitive preference or taste for race. It is the
result of a minority population being sorted more coarsely due to the categorical way in
which memories are stored. This also contrasts with statistical discrimination since it is
not a multiple equilibrium phenomenon where it could equally as well be the majority
that is discriminated against, but rather it results from an inherent bias against minority
interactions in the process of categorization of human memory, even when qualications
are fully observable. The latter deserves considerable emphasis, as it provides a second
vital distinction between our model of categorical discrimination and that of statistical
discrimination.
Our example might seem to be ambiguous in terms of the outcomes for blacks, as the
black-lows are beneting from being stored as \black" rather than \black-low". How-
ever, let us now go one step further and endogenize the decision to acquire human capital.
Given that blacks expect to be categorized as \black", they have less incentive to invest
in high levels of human capital since such investments are under-appreciated by employ-
ers. Hence, this can lead to lower investment rates in human capital by minority group
5
members. So, in the end we end up with more \black-low" types in the black population.
Let us make a couple of remarks about the example. First, why are employers in-
terested in keeping track of race at all? In this example, there is no need for them to
do so as race is not tied to productivity, even statistically. Nevertheless, humans keep
track of race in categorizing memories (there is substantial evidence in this regard
5
). The
explanation is that categorization and memories are used for many tasks. Race is one of
the most easily and directly identiable traits, and in many situations will correlate with
other attributes. As memories are used for many functions, race can be a useful attribute
to keep track of for a variety of interactions. Furthermore, to the extent that one sees
endogenous choices to acquire human capital inuenced by race, keeping track of race
becomes a useful predictor of productivity, echoing the ideas of statistical discrimination.
Second, why won't some employers benet from categorizing dierently? There are
prots to be had if one employer is able to overcome their categorical bias while others do
not. Indeed, this is a possibility. The question is whether there are suÆciently many such
employers to give incentives to minority group members to make eÆcient investments in
education and human capital. This point is clearly developed by Becker (1957) in a
model with tastes for race. Moreover, if there are frictions in the market, for instance
any search costs in nding employment, even having such employers around might not be
suÆcient to induce eÆcient investment in human capital by minorities. At the least, to
the extent that there are fewer such employers than those who do not overcome the bias,
there is still a tilting in favor of majority group members in nding full recognition in the
hiring process. This bias aects the choices regarding investment, which then reinforce
the bias.
As this example has pointed out, categorization can lead to biases against minorities
and to discrimination. It also has interesting predictions for how minorities might group
themselves. To the extent that they can group themselves in ways that make interaction
more likely with decision makers who have had relatively large numbers of interactions
with minorities (for example more interactions with minorities than majorities), they can
be made better o as this will change the categorization. We also see in this example
that there are some subtleties to these claims. For instance, if the population of black-
high was larger than the population of white-low, then it would make sense to sort
dierently, so that it was low types who are coarsely sorted rather than blacks. Also,
many complications arise and things become a bit more clouded when we move to many
dimensions of attributes and a large number of categories. Here with only two dimensions
and two types on each dimension things are fairly unambiguous. With large numbers of
categories and attributes, it can be that certain subgroups are treated dierently, so that
conclusions are not so clear cut. Nevertheless, we still can show some basic biases. We
will see more of this when we return to a more detailed discussion of categorization of
minority groups, after the presentation of the model of categorization.
5
For instance, see Hart et. al., (2000) and Phelps et. al., (2000)
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3 A Model of Categorization
Before presenting the details of the model, let us rst discuss its overall edice and some
of the evidence which led us to structure it in this way.
In understanding how a human groups memories and stores them in the brain, psy-
chologists have developed ideas of how categories are important. There is substantial
experimental evidence that when faced with an object or person, a given individual's
brain \automatically" activates a category that, according to some metric, best matches
the given object (and at times context) in question.
6
There is also new evidence in social
psychology and \social neuroscience" that the brain pays particular attention to racial
identity.
7
While the reasons behind the use of categories are not yet completely under-
stood, there are theories based on the eÆciency of storage and retrieval of information
(much like the organizing of a le system on a computer) as well as speed in being able
to react.
8
Eectively, this is a bounded rationality story in which there are both costs to
storing details of every past interaction separately, and costs to and delays in activating
stored information based on how nely it is stored. So, the rst piece of the puzzle
from our perspective is that a given decision maker will store information from their past
experiences in a nite set of bins to be called \categories." We sidestep the interesting
question of how the number of such categories might be selected, and for now simply
take it to be some given number n.
The second question regards both how new information is stored in categories as well
as how it is called up.
9
The activation of a category when faced with a new object is
accomplished through a matching of the \attributes" of the object with the attributes
associated with the category. In particular, an \attribute" is one of the observable
characteristics of the object. Associated with each category is an idea of which attributes
something in that category should have. For instance if we think of a category of \bird",
then it would have \beak", \feathers", \wings", etc., as attributes associated with it. We
call the list of attributes associated with a category a \prototype." The given object's
attributes are then compared to the prototypes of dierent categories until a best match is
found. The precise process by which such matching is made is not completely understood
at present based on what we have seen in the psychology literature.
10
We assume that
decision makers act in rough congruence with a sort of \cognitive eÆciency," which we
take as the minimization of a distance metric between the given object and the matching
6
For example, see Allport (1954), Bargh (1994, 1997, 1999) for views on the automaticity of categorical
thinking, and Dovidio et. al. (1986) for some of the experimental evidence.
7
For instance, see Hart et. al. (2000) and Phelps et. al (2000)
8
Rosch (1978) is perhaps the most precise. She argues that humans are searching for \cognitive
eÆciency" by minimizing the variation in attributes within each category for a xed set of categories.
9
There is evidence that the storage of information and the categorization structure is quite dierent
in young children during their \developmental stages" than when they are adults (see Hayne, 1996, and
Quinn and Eimas, 1996). While understanding the development of categories is an important question,
we will focus on the behavior of adult decision makers, whose categorical structure is largely in place.
10
For example, see Sternberg and Ben-Zeev (2001), Chapter 3.
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prototype. This matching process is what is often called \identication."
11
The third piece of the puzzle is what is then to be done with the categorical informa-
tion once it is activated. For instance, once a decision maker has activated a category for
a new object, say \bird", what happens next? This is where the theory of \stereotypes"
comes into play. The idea of a stereotype is that it is an association of a given category
with a series of dierent possible behaviors or other characteristics
12
. The priming of the
category leads to an activation of the stereotype, which is the basis for the prediction of
future behavior. The formation of stereotypes is another place where the understanding
in the psychology literature is still a bit nebulous.
13
Here we model the stereotype as
built on past interactions with objects in a given category. This black-boxes the issue of
whether this is entirely built on a person's own interactions or also through what they
might have heard or vicariously experienced, as we can treat such vicarious information
as being stored in the same way. We shall, however, refer to a representative type for a
category as a \prototype" rather than a \stereotype," for reasons that we come back to
discuss later.
14
On top of this automatic process of identication with a category and calling of a
prototype, there is evidence that people then go through a thinking process where the
conscious mind reasons through the information it has at hand.
15
In situations where an
individual has time to think (which are often more relevant in economic applications) the
reaction may move beyond reacting to the prototype. Here individuals more carefully
review the past situations that they can recall based on the category that has been
activated and bring in other considerations. This part of the puzzle is probably the
most complicated and the least well understood from the psychological perspective. This
is, therefore, the part of the model where our treatment will be the most ad hoc. We
borrow from the impressive case-based theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) to address
how a person might more carefully form expectations. In particular, given the activated
category the decision maker compares the given object and situation to those stored
in the category vis-a-vis a similarity function. Predictions are then made in a manner
weighted by this similarity function.
Based on these dierent pieces of the puzzle, the crux of this paper is to put together a
formal model of a decision maker which is consistent with what psychologists know about
11
See Rosch (1978).
12
In the psychology literature these are also often referred to as attributes (Hamilton and Sherman,
1994; Hamilton et. al., 1990; Stangor and Ford, 1992; and Stangor and Lange, 1994). Here we separate
readily identiable attributes used in rst activating a category, like \beak", \wings", etc., with those
things such as characteristics or behaviors that we might try to predict, like, \is diÆcult to catch",
\is frightened of cats", etc. This distinction is somewhat articial, but will be very useful from our
perspective.
13
See Hilton and Von Hippell (1996). For instance, part will be based on personal experience, but
part can also be based on public information. There is evidence that people can accurately describe the
\stereotype" associated with a given group or category that they believe others to have, even if it is not
exactly what comes up in their own minds.
14
For a discussion of some of the standard uses of these terms, see Hilton and von Hippel (1996).
15
See Bargh (1984) and Leopore and Brown (1997).
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how the human mind stores and retrieves information and uses it to form predictions
about behavior that are relevant to economists.
The Basic Building Blocks
Categories
C = fC
1
; : : : ; C
n
g is a nite set of categories. These will be \le folders" in our
decision maker's brain that will be useful for the storing of information.
Objects
O is the potentially innite set of objects that are to be sorted or encountered. These
will generally be the agents with whom our decision maker might interact, such as the
workers they may hire or have hired if they are an employer. We should emphasize that
an object is not simply a physical object, but is in eect a particular experience or view
of an interaction. Thus, a number of dierent interactions with the same person under
dierent circumstances would be viewed as dierent objects. Further, an object might
also be a vicarious interaction, such as viewing a movie or a news report, rather than a
direct personal interaction.
Attributes
There is a nite set of attributes. Let m be the number of attributes. Attributes
are the easily identied traits that may be possessed by an object. These might be race,
sex, hair color, nationality, education level, which schools they attended, their grades,
age, where someone lives, the pitch of their voice, etc. Dierent attributes might be
observable in dierent situations. If I meet someone in a cocktail party I might see some
easily observed attributes, and not observe some such as their grades, work experience,
etc. In contrast, if I am interviewing them for a job, I may observe their transcripts and
resume, but may not know whether they are married or like to bike ride. For simplicity in
our modeling, we will assume that each object has the same set of observable attributes,
but the model is very easily altered to allow for the more general case.
16
Let  : O ! [0; 1]
m
denote the function, written as (
1
(o); : : : ; 
m
(o)), which describes
the attributes that each object has. For instance 
k
(o) = 1 means that object o has
attribute k. More generally, 
k
(o) = :7 would indicate that object o has some intensity
(.7) of attribute k. If, for instance, the attribute is \blond", then this might be a measure
16
Simply extend the range of the  function, dened below, to have a ; possibility on various dimensions
that mean that the dimension is not observed. In terms of sorting, there are many dierent ways to
treat unobserved dimensions - simply ignoring them works, as well as imputing some average value, or
trying to estimate them based on past correlations with other dimensions.
9
of \how blond" the person's hair is. For some attributes it might be that 
k
(o) 2 f0; 1g
(for instance gender), but for others the possession of an attribute might lie between 0
and 1. There are some attributes that come in many avors, such as race or ethnicity.
These can simply be coded by having a dimension for each race. Then if a person is coded
as having a 1 in the attribute \Black", they would get a 0 in the attribute \Asian". This
also allows for the coding of mixed races, etc.
Categorization
The basic building blocks above are simply descriptions of objects. Once an object
is encountered, then it is stored in memory by assigning it to a category. For simplicity,
we will assume that each object is assigned to just one category, although we realize that
this is with some loss of generality. Let f : O ! C denote the function that keeps track
of the assignment of each object to a category, where f(o) = C
i
means that object o
has been assigned to category C
i
. This is how objects are stored in the decision maker's
memory.
Prototypes
Given some set of objects that have been categorized, O; and a categorization f , the
decision-maker will nd it useful to capture the essence of a category through a prototype.
This is essentially a representative object. Prototype theory in the social psychology
literature (Posner and Keele, 1968, and Reed, 1972) was designed to show that people
create a representation of a category's central tendency in the form of a prototype. A
prototype, according to this view, is judged to be prototypical of a category \in proportion
to the extent to which it has family resemblance to, or shows overlapping attributes with,
other objects in the category" (e.g. robin shares the highest number of features with other
birds). More generally, a prototype for a category might also be developed in other ways,
for instance through some statistic other than mode (e.g., mean, etc.). A very natural
prototype of some group is simply the average across attribute vectors of objects in the
category.
For some group of objects O let the mean attribute vector be given by
(O) =
P
o2O
(o)
#fOg
: (1)
Let us emphasize that (O) is a vector: the average of the attribute vectors of all the
objects in O. The mean of a category C
i
under a categorization f is then simply

f
(C
i
) = (fo : f(o) = C
i
g): (2)
For now, let us think of 
f
(C
i
) as being the prototype for category C
i
, although this is
not essential in what follows.
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Measuring Variation
Let us begin with an initial set of objects that our decision maker has interacted with
in the past, O. The decision maker has categorized these according to some f . In some
situations it will be useful for us to think about an \optimal" method of categorization.
There are many possible ways to do this, and we pick an obvious one. We dene an
optimal categorization as categorizing past objects in a way to minimize the total sum
(across objects) of within-category variance. In order to do this, we need to be explicit
about how variation is measured.
First, let d be some measure of the distance between two vectors of attributes. It
can make a dierence how one keeps track of the distance between two attribute vectors.
In some situations, it will be easy, natural, and salient to use the \city-block" metric.
That is, when comparing two vectors, one simply looks at how far apart they are on each
dimension and then adds up across dimensions. Another natural measure of distance
would be the Euclidean metric which measures the magnitude of the vector dierence.
In the mathematical psychology literature, however, it has been argued for some time
that when the attributes of objects are obvious or separable, spatial or geometric models
should be constructed using the city-block metric rather than a Euclidean metric (Arabie,
1991; Attneave, 1950; Householder and Landahl, 1945; Shephard, 1987; Torgerson, 1958).
As will be clear, this choice will not have much impact on our results. Nevertheless, unless
indicated otherwise, we will stick with the city-block metric.
Let the variation of a group of objects simply be the total sum of distances from the
mean:
V ar(O) =
X
o2O
d

(o); (O)

; (3)
The total sum of within category variance under a categorization f is then simply sum-
ming the variation across the categories of objects:
V ar(f; O) =
X
C
i
2C
V ar(fo : f(o) 2 C
i
g): (4)
This leads to the following denition.
An Optimal Categorization
An optimal categorization function relative to O is a categorization f

that minimizes
V ar(f; O):
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f

2 argmin
f :O!C
V ar(f; O):
Identication: Assignment of New Objects to Categories
17
There may be multiple solutions to this problem, but there is always at least one for any nite set
of objects.
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When encountering a new object o, given an existing categorization f and past set
of objects O, it will also be useful for the decision maker to assign the new object to
a category. Generally, a decision-maker will not re-categorize all objects every time
he or she encounters a new object. While at a developmental phase, it is clear that
children's categorizations are much more temporary and exible, evidence suggests that
adult categorizations are more stationary (e.g., Hayne, 1996, and Quinn and Eimas,
1996).
Let f
new
(o) denote the category to which this new object is assigned. There are many
ways in which this might be done. For instance, it might be that
f
new
(o) 2 argmin
C
i
d

(o); 
f
(C
i
)

:
This method simply nds the category to which the new object is closest. Instead, one
might dene
f
new
2 argmin
f
new
2F (f)
V ar(f
new
; O [ fog)
where
F (f) = ff
new
: f
new
j
O
= f j
O
g:
This is a slightly more sophisticated manner of assigning the new object to a category.
It takes into account the fact that the new object will aect the category to which it is
assigned, as in particular it will change the mean attribute vector. This minimizes the
total sum of variation, subject to holding the previous objects in their previous categories.
For suÆciently large O, these two methods of dening f
new
will be approximately the
same. In either case, we are assuming that f is not necessarily re-optimized, but simply
that o is added to a sensible category now. Hence, f
new
just represents the concatenation
of the old f with the assignment of the new object. Note also that we are not requiring
the f to have been optimal to begin with. It might be that f is only periodically \re-
optimized."
Similarity
A function s : O ! O keeps track of how similar two objects are. For instance, one
example of a similarity function might be 1 minus the distance between the attributes of
the objects:
s(o; o
0
) = 1  d((o); (o
0
)):
Here if the two objects have identical attributes then their distance is 0 and so their
similarity is 1. In contrast if they are maximally distant (here taking the distance function
to map into [0,1] so a maximal distance is 1)
18
then the similarity will be 0.
Prediction
18
We have not assumed any normalization on distance, and so this may need to be normalized.
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Now let us suppose that the decision maker faces a new object and must choose
an action from a set of actions A. One can think of the object as a new worker and
the decision is whether or not to hire the worker. Let us also suppose that the decision
maker has experienced some of the dierent actions before with some past objects. Dene
U(a; o
0
) as the utility that the decision maker has obtained from using action a in the
past against object o
0
. A prediction, then, for what utility one might expect from action
a against object o can then be made based on:
EU(a; o) =
X
o
0
2f
new
(o)
s(o; o
0
)U(a; o
0
): (5)
Note, EU(a; o) is implicitly a function of the f; O; s and history of interactions U(a; o
0
)'s.
This is an adaptation of case-based decision theory, developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler
(2001), to the categorical model. We shall ignore the issues of how to normalize U for
situations where a past action has never been taken, and simply refer to the reader to
Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) for discussion of such issues.
3.1 A Categorization Theorem
For simplicity, for the remainder of the paper let us suppose that attributes are such
that an object either has an attribute or does not.
19
That is, for each o 2 O and each
k 2 f1; : : : ; mg, 
k
(o) 2 f0; 1g. When faced with a limited number of categories, a
decision maker will be forced to assign some dierent types of objects into the same
category. That is the primary source of impact of the categorical thinking. The question
of which types end up grouped together has important implications, as we have already
seen in the labor market example in Section 2. In that example, we saw that it was the
smallest groups of types that were categorized together. The intuition being that this
has the least impact on the within category variation. We can now develop this idea
more generally, and show how the categorization model operates. First, a few useful
denitions.
Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Groups
Let us say that a group of objects is homogeneous if all objects have the same vector
of attributes, and heterogeneous otherwise. That is, O is homogeneous if o 2 O and
o
0
2 O implies that (o) = (o
0
). O is heterogeneous if there exist o 2 O and o
0
2 O such
that (o) 6= (o
0
).
A group of heterogeneous objects might be split up in various ways, in cases where
it consists of a number of dierent types. Let us consider splitting a group up into two
parts. A natural way to try to do this (and more on why this is \natural" below), is to
19
This has some impact, since it may prohibit scaling of attributes. The reason that scaling might
matter is that it would allow for dierential importance assigned to dierent attributes when, for instance,
measuring how far apart two types are.
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try to divide it in such a way that comes as close to being slit into equal parts as possible.
So, for instance, let us suppose that we are looking at a set of objects that we call \birds".
We might think of splitting that group up into birds that are \red" and birds that are
\not red". This might end up with a relatively small group of birds that are red and a
much larger group that are not. We might also think of dividing it according to whether
the birds can y or not, or by size, or where they live, etc. Specically, as we look across
dierent attributes, we might nd the attribute that splits the group most evenly. Let
us dene an attribute that splits a group of objects most evenly as being an eÆcient
splitting attribute
20
. More formally, an attribute k is an eÆcient splitting attribute for
a group of objects O if
k 2 argmin
k
0
j#fo 2 Oj
k
0
(o) = 1g  #fo 2 Oj
k
0
(o) = 0gj:
A splitting of a group of heterogeneous objects O into groups O
A
and O
B
is said to be
an eÆcient splitting if there is an eÆcient splitting attribute k such that
O
A
= fo 2 Oj
k
(o) = 1g and O
B
= fo 2 Oj
k
(o) = 0g:
Let us emphasize that this denition of an \eÆcient" splitting is a crude one, as it
does not account for how close the various types involved are in terms of the number of
attributes on which they dier. This denition allows for a fairly easy statement of our
results. With a more complex denition of eÆcient, one could improve the bounds in the
theorems below.
Frequency of Interaction and Categorization
The following theorem provides some of the basic intuition behind how objects are
categorized. In particular, it looks at a simple problem which is the building block of
an eÆcient categorization problem: which groups of objects does one lump together and
which ones does one separate.
Theorem 1 Consider two dierent homogenous groups of objects O
1
and O
2
with cor-
responding cardinalities n
1
and n
2
, and let h be the number of attributes on which they
dier, where m  h  0. Consider a heterogeneous group of objects O
3
with an eÆ-
cient splitting into O
A
, O
B
, with corresponding cardinalities n
A
and n
B
. Finally, con-
sider a categorization f of a set of objects O that includes O
1
, O
2
and O
3
, such that
f
 1
(C
1
) = O
1
, f
 1
(C
2
) = O
2
, and f
 1
(C
3
) = O
3
. If
1
n
1
+
1
n
2
>
h
n
A
+
h
n
B
; (6)
then there exists another categorization
b
f of O which dominates f (i.e., V ar(
b
f; O) <
V ar(f; O)). In particular, regrouping O
1
and O
2
together, and splitting O
3
apart will
lower total variation, and so
b
f can be dened by
b
f
 1
(C
1
) = O
1
[ O
2
,
b
f
 1
(C
2
) = O
A
,
b
f
 1
(C
3
) = O
B
, and
b
f(C
i
) = f(C
i
) for i > 3.
20
It is possible to have more than one such attribute.
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The proof of Theorem 1 appears in the appendix.
While the theorem is long-winded, what it is saying is fairly simple and intuitive.
Suppose that we have categorized things so that O
1
, O
2
and O
3
each have their own
categories. When would we do better by re- categorizing so that we split up O
3
and
instead put O
1
and O
2
together? This is better in situations where
 the sizes of O
1
and O
2
are relatively small (so, this gives a large
1
n
1
+
1
n
2
in inequality
(6)),
 O
1
and O
2
are fairly similar in their attributes (so h is small on the right hand side
of inequality (6)), and
 O
A
and O
B
are relatively large and so it is eÆcient to assign them to their own
categories (so
1
n
A
+
1
n
B
is small in inequality (6)).
In terms of returning to the intuition of the labor market example, groups of objects
that are minority objects are smaller in size, and so this theorem tells us that eÆcient
categorizations will generally group them together before grouping types of majority
objects together.
The condition in Theorem 1 is a suÆcient condition, but not a necessary one. This is
due to the complexity of the formula for the variation in a heterogeneous group of more
than two types. In the case where the heterogeneous group consists of exactly two types,
then we obtain a fuller characterization of eÆcient categorization.
Theorem 2 Consider four dierent homogenous groups of objects O
1
, O
2
, O
3
and O
4
,
with corresponding cardinalities n
1
, n
2
, n
3
, and n
4
. Let h
12
be the number of attributes
on which O
1
and O
2
dier, and h
34
be the corresponding number for O
3
and O
4
.
V ar(O
1
[O
2
) < V ar(O
3
[ O
4
)
if and only if
h
34
n
1
+
h
34
n
2
>
h
12
n
3
+
h
12
n
4
:
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in the appendix.
Note, this provides a simple corollary: suppose that we have three groups of objects
and we want to know which two groups, when put together, will result in the smallest
total variation. The two groups i and j which minimize n
i
n
j
h
ij
, are the best ones to put
together. Thus, as intuition suggests, groups are more likely to be (eÆciently) categorized
together if they are smaller and more similar.
15
4 Categorization and Minority Groups
The previous section provided a detailed model of categorization in decision making. We
now illustrate it by analyzing categorization in the presence of a \minority" group. This
is a more general development of the example in Section 2, and illustrates in more detail
some of the issues that arise and assumptions that are needed to conclude something
about the categorization of minority groups more generally.
Consider a decision-maker facing a nite set of objects O. For simplicity, we shall
also assume that every type of object has at least one representative in O. That is every
possible vector of 0's and 1's exists in the population. This is easily relaxed but leads to
complications in the proofs.
Minority Groups
Let us now dene what a \minority" group is. Consider a set of objects O and some
attribute k with respect to which we are dening a group. That is, suppose that we are
interested in the group of objects that have attribute 
k
(o) = 0.
21
This might be race, or
say left-handed individuals.
A group of objects having attribute k = 0 is a minority group of objects in O if for
every 
 k
2 f0; 1g
m 1
:
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 0 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g < #fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 1 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g: (7)
A strict minority group of objects in O is such that
max

 k
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 0 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g < min

 k
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 1 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g:
(8)
The denition of minority group requires that whatever type of object having that at-
tribute are in a smaller number in the population than objects with the same type except
for not having that attribute. For instance, let us suppose that there are three possible
attributes, so that the attributes of an object are represented by vectors (0,0,0), (1,0,0),
(0,1,1), etc. Moreover, suppose that it is the rst attribute we are interested in, so we
want to check whether the population of objects of the form (0,, ) is a minority popula-
tion. The denition requires that there are fewer (0,0,0)'s than (1,0,0)'s; fewer (0,1,0)'s
than (1,1,0)'s; fewer (0,1,1)'s than (1,1,1)'s; etc. The denition of strict minority group
is even stronger. It means that every type of object that falls in the minority group has
a lower frequency in the population than any type of object that falls in the majority
group. Going back to our example from above, it requires that there are fewer (0,0,0)'s
than (1,0,0)'s and than (1,1,0)'s and than (1,0,1)'s, and than (1,1,1)'s; and the same for
(0,1,0) and so forth. This really requires the minority group to have fewer members of
every type in a strong sense.
21
The denitions have obvious analogs for a group of objects having attribute 
k
= 1.
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While the denition of strict minority group is demanding, keep in mind that this
will be in reference to the set of objects that a given observer will have encountered. In
many cases, this set may have strong selection biases, that result in seeing more objects
with certain attributes than with others, as the observer will generally not be seeing a
random selection of objects.
A Corollary on Categorizations of Strict Minority Groups
In order to establish a result analogous to that of the example in Section 2 we need
some bounds on the relative frequencies of dierent types both within the minority group
and across the minority and majority group. For a strict minority group, the external
ratio of the group is
r
E
=
min

 k
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 1 and  k(o) =  kg
max

 k
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 0 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g
:
The external ratio keeps track of how large the smallest group of majority objects (in
terms of type) is relative to the largest group of minority objects. This will always be a
number greater than 1 for a strict minority, and gives a rough idea of the extent to which
majority members outnumber minority members.
Let the internal ratio of the group be
r
I
=
max

 k
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 0 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g
min

 k
#fo 2 O j 
k
(o) = 0 and 
 k
(o) = 
 k
g
:
This is a similar ratio except that it keeps track of how large the biggest group of minority
objects is compared to the smallest group of minority objects. This might be thought of
as a very rough measure of heterogeneity of the minority population. If it is close to 1,
then the minority group is divided into equally sized subgroups of every possible type.
If this ratio becomes larger then there are some types that are much more frequent and
some that are less frequent in the minority population.
Corollary 3 Consider a set of objects that are optimally categorized. If a strict minority
group dened relative to an attribute k has external and internal ratios that satisfy r
E
(2 
r
I
) > 1, and the number of categories n satises:
2
m
> n > 2
m 1
+ 2
m 2
+ 2
m 3
  1;
then minority objects are strictly more coarsely sorted than majority objects; and in
particular
 objects are segregated according to attribute k (objects from the minority group are
never placed in a category with any majority objects); and
 majority types are perfectly sorted (any two objects from the majority group that
are in the same category must have the same type).
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The proof of Corollary 3 appears in the appendix.
Corollary 3 provides suÆcient conditions for a more coarse sorting to occur for a
strict minority group. These produce an unambiguously coarser categorization for the
minority group. These conditions are far from necessary, but even so the proof is fairly
complicated. Most of the intuition is already conveyed in the example in Section 2 and
the proof works through the challenges posed by the added dimensions of attributes,
which are substantial. Rather than detail the proof, let us simply outline the role of the
dierent conditions in the corollary and why they are useful.
First, the strictness of the minority group overcomes the problem that some less
frequent types might be grouped together regardless of the minority/majority charac-
teristic. Most importantly, depending on the relative frequency in the two populations,
the grouping could take some forms that combine the types from the groups in dierent
ways so that an unambiguous characterization is no longer possible. Next, the bounds
on n play a role as follows. If n is at least 2
m
, then each type has its own category so
the categorization is degenerate. If n is too small, then it can be that various majority
group types are grouped together as well as minority group types. For instance, it might
be that (1,1,1)'s are grouped with (1,1,0)'s, while under the minorities it is the (0,1,0)'s
are grouped with (0,0,0)'s. The comparison of how they are grouped is no longer unam-
biguous. Interestingly, as n tends toward
7
8
2
m
(the lower bound as m becomes large),
minorities are grouped in fewer and fewer categories, while the majority continues to be
perfectly sorted. There is an interesting implication of this analysis. To the extent that
the number of categories n correlates with some measure of \intelligence" (there is no
direct evidence on this) we would expect agents with lower \intelligence" to be more
likely to think of minorities as homogeneous. Finally, the internal and external ratios
are also important in ensuring that the majority types each are assigned to their own
category, for the same reason as mentioned above.
These strong assumptions provide for a very strong result concerning the unambigu-
ously coarser sorting of the minority group. This is merely meant to be suggestive and to
give an idea of how it is that categorization can lead to a dierent treatment of minority
members. This also shows the tractability of the model of categorization. More generally,
one can expect the categorization to be more ambiguous and complex, as there are likely
to be dierences in the types one observes across dierent populations. For instance,
there are more blacks than whites attending inner-city public schools in most U.S. cities.
Nevertheless, the basic insight that smaller groups will tend to be more coarsely sorted
in some rough sense carries through (see Theorem 1).
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5 Choice of Attributes, Self-Categorization, and Iden-
tity
Many attributes that an individual possesses are actually actively chosen, especially
those that are easily observed such as clothing, hair style, tattoos, etc. Given that such
attributes will be noticed by others, and will often play a role in categorization, these
choices are important and can provide information and signals to others. In short, we
can view the choice of attributes as a choice of identity, and it is clear that choosing one's
identity is an important economic decision.
Identity has been the subject of a wealth of research in sociology (Goman, 1963) and
psychology (see Ellemers, et. al., 2002, for a review), and a couple of papers in economics.
In particular, a recent paper by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) show how individual prefer-
ences relating to identity can have important implications for a wide variety of decisions.
Here we try to develop a more primitive understanding of identity than that which has
appeared before. The model we have put forth in the previous sections allow us to do
just that, since identity is self-categorization. In essence, categorization involves sorting
attributes (objects) into categories in a cognitively eÆcient manner, whereas, identity is
about the endogenous choices of those attributes; realizing that other decision makers
are categorizing. In what follows, we briey describe how identity, as viewed from our
model, can be coupled with two existing models in economics, though these applications
are far from exhaustive.
Signaling
One obvious way in which the choice of identity might matter, is in signalling. This
would be a slight variation on Spence's famous (1974) model. Agents choose some ob-
servable attributes, such as education, attitude and clothing, and have some attributes
which are diÆcult to observe, such as productivity. To the extent that the cost of some
observable attributes correlate with productivity, they can serve as a separating or sort-
ing device in some situations. When separation occurs in Spence's setting, it is the high
productivity types who invest in suÆcient amounts of the observable attributes so that
the low productivity types do not nd it benecial to mimic them, even given that the
high productivity types will be recognized as such by their observable attributes and re-
ceive higher wages. Eectively, this choice of observable attributes is a choice of identity.
In our model this would work not through any direct inference of employers, but simply
through the fact that they will come to categorize those who have high cost investments
in a category which has high average productivity, and those without the investments
in a category that ends up having lower average productivity. Thus, Spence's signaling
ideas provide a direct impetus for the choice of identity. Identity, then, is an equilibrium
phenomenon that captures the fact that high productivity types are investing in seem-
ingly irrelevant activities and these identities become endogenous characteristics of high
productivity types
22
.
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A similar argument is made by Fang (2001) in a statistical discrimination model with endogenous
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Culture and Identity
Consider a stylized illustration of a community in Catalonia, Spain. Each agent
decides whether to invest their time in learning Catalan (a romance language spoken
mainly by the local population) or computer programming. Investments in computer
programming are valued in the global labor market, whereas, Catalan is only valued in
the small local community. Agents observe each other's investment portfolio, and can
calculate the conditional probability of any agent being in the community in the future.
Investments in Catalan yield a relatively high probability of being in the community in
the future, since it is not valued elsewhere, and investments in computer programming
yield a relatively low probability. Agents prefer to interact with those with whom they
know they will have a lasting interaction. One can then envision that agents are more
likely to want to interact or cooperate with others if they observe suÆcient investment
in Catalan skills (i.e. the likelihood of being in the community in the future is relatively
high). Agents face a tension between being successful in the global labor market and
cooperating with their local peers.
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Consider, a three attribute example where the unobserved attribute is one's will-
ingness to cooperate in repeated play. Assume that the observed attributes allow the
community to calculate the likelihood of any agent being around in the future. For ex-
ample, good computer programming skills and low literacy in Catalan may imply that
you are likely to leave Catalonia. Hence, the community will not cooperate with agents
who invest too much in computer programming or too little in Catalan. The general
point is that when one is deciding whether or not to invest in a particular identity (albeit
\ghetto", \black bourgeoisie", \white yuppie", etc.) they realize that this investment (in
language, clothing, etc.) will be used by their community to infer the potential payo
from repeated social interactions with them. This does not depend on any complicated
calculations by the community, but simply categorization of experiences. Thus, cou-
pling the models of categorization and cultural capital provides an explanation of why
particular attributes are associated with particular communities.
Correlation in Attributes
When individuals choose an identity, \being from the streets," \being tough," or
whatever, it is curious why they do not invest in just one attribute that signals their
type. Instead, they seemingly invest in extreme behaviors. For instance, when choosing
to be identied with \being tough," an individual may invest in tattoos, body piercings,
clothing, language, attitude, hair style, and the like, instead of just picking one at-
tribute.
24
Why? An answer comes directly out of our model, when there is be suÆcient
heterogeneity in the population of observers.
group choice. Our model of categorization can also be used to extend Fang's work.
23
See Fryer (2002b) for a more elaborate discussion.
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This is casual empiricism. We have no direct social scientic evidence of this.
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As an example, suppose there are three decision makers, A, B, and C, who believe
that being tough is associated with directly observable attributes (1,1,0); (0,1,1); and
(1,0,1) respectively, based on their past individual experiences. By associated we mean
that they have some category with a prototype of such a vector, that also is a category
where they have seen past \tough" behavior. Given this variation, if an individual were
to choose an identity of (1,1,0), then s/he would be recognized as \tough" by decision
maker A. However, this vector diers in two attributes from the prototypes of each of
B and C. So, it is quite possible that this may not lead to a \tough" categorization by
decision makers B and C. If instead, the person chooses an identity of (1,1,1), while not
matching the \tough" prototype of any single decision maker, the person is within one
attribute of the prototype of each. Thus, we might see attributes becoming linked. Note
also, that this reinforces itself. As more hopeful \toughs" choose (1,1,1), more of these
types will appear and the categorizations will be further skewed.
These examples provide a avor for the types of applications that are likely to be
inuenced by our model of social categorization, but one may think beyond these to
include such things as conformity, gang behavior, and voting.
6 Some Further Remarks
Social cognition and categorization are inextricably linked. Because of this, prejudice
and discrimination may be inevitable consequences of our cognitive processes. The re-
sulting implications for policy makers and academicians interested in, for instance, racial
inequality can be complicated. In what follows, we briey discuss a few implications for
educational interventions, equal opportunity laws, and role-model arguments of aÆrma-
tive action.
Given our model, it seems that a critical goal ought to be integrating students in a
potpourri of races and ethnic groups early in life while their categorization structure is
still exible. Given the lack of housing integration among the races (Massey and Denton,
1993), kids are signicantly more likely to only interact with others of their same race.
In fact, Fryer and Levitt (2002) report that 35% of white students attend a kindergarten
where there are no black students. Having suÆciently many minorities in schools with
other non-minorities might go a long way in changing their categorization structures.
Another area in which the eects of categorical cognition could be felt is in the
design and implementation of equal opportunity laws. As it stands, Title VII's disparate
treatment model of discrimination is premised on the notion that intergroup bias is
malevolent in origin. Our model, however, shows how discrimination can arise even
when agents have no a priori motivation to do so. Regulating cognitive processes, on the
other hand, is an impossible assignment. Krieger (1995) proposes several solutions and
extensions to the current Title VII legislation to account for this. Most fundamentally, she
argues that \courts should reformulate disparate treatment doctrine to reect the reality
that disparate treatment discrimination can result from things other than discriminatory
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intent." To establish liability for disparate treatment discrimination, a Title VII plainti
would simply be required to prove that his group membership played a role in causing
the employer's action or decision. While these ideas are promising, they have yet to be
investigated in a formal model.
A New View of Role Models
Allen (1995) reports three dierent types repercussions of role models: (1) moral -
eects on preferences, perhaps through conformity eects; (2) information - provision of
information on the present value of current decisions; and (3) mentors - resources through
which human capital can be augmented. Most research, in economics, is aligned with the
informational repercussions of role models.
25
In those analyses the role model provides
information that similar types have the ability to succeed at a given task. In particular, it
is future emulators who are learning from the role model. While that may be an important
aspect of a role model, our analysis also provides another new view of a role model:
teaching the decision makers (e.g., employers) and not just the potential emulators. In
essence, a black Supreme Court Justice not only shows black children that blacks can
obtain the highest ranking judicial appointment, but just as importantly it shows this to
majority group members as well. Furthermore, because optimal categorization depends
on the frequency of interaction (which comes with visibility and repeated instances),
our model makes it easy to understand why Tiger Woods or the Williams' sisters (as
role models) have larger impacts on minority participation in particular sports than Ken
Chenault (CEO of American Express) or Stanley O'neal (COO of Merrill Lynch) has on
minority business majors in college.
Stereotypes
In our model, we have been careful to use the term \prototype" for the representative
of a category, rather than the term \stereotype". There is evidence that individuals
can quite accurately identify a \stereotype" for a given vector of attributes that will be
common to others or possibly even to a cultural history, even without having that as
their own belief.
26
While this is a bit beyond our model - a stereotype might be thought
of as knowing something about other people's categorizations and prototypes. While
this makes it possible to view stereotypes as prototypes coming through some indirect or
vicarious experiences, it seems to put them on a dierent (meta-) level from prototypes
and this explains our distinction in the use of the term.
Testing the Model
25
See Chung (2000) or Jackson and Kalai (1997).
26
See Hilton and von Hippel (1996) for an overview of some of the literature on stereotyping. Gen-
erally, prototype models are thought of as a particular type of stereotyping, while we are arguing that
stereotypes might best be viewed as a dierent object than a prototype.
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While we have paid close attention to the evidence in the psychology literature in
constructing our model, it still puts enough pieces together that direct tests of the model
would be of interest. In particular, whether less frequent types of objects are more
coarsely sorted, is something that could be directly tested to see whether such types of
objects have more biased predictions associated with them. In particular, an important
implication of our model is not simply that less frequent types of objects will have less
accurate predictions associated with them, but that they will have biased predictions
associated with them.
Indirect testing, through the implications for things such as discrimination, are also
possible. To the extent that there is simply a taste for discrimination, one might see
similar levels of discrimination in, for instance, whether or not one goes to a restaurant
that employs black workers and whether or not one chooses a black doctor from a medical
plan. Our model, would predict that to the extent that one has fewer experiences with
black doctors relative to black fast-food workers, the behavior might be very dierent.
Also, our model can be distinguished from statistical discrimination by examining to
what extent observable skill levels matter. In our model, discriminating behavior can
exist even when skills are observable, while a statistical discrimination model would not
allow for such discrimination.
7 Appendix
The following claims are useful in the proof of Theorems 1, 2, and Corollary 3. We work
with the city-block metric and again assume that attributes take on values in f0; 1g,
throughout.
When dealing with objects o and o
0
, we will often write d(o; o
0
) to represent d((o); (o
0
)).
Claim 4 For any group of objects O with cardinality n,
V ar(O) =
X
o2O
d((o); (O)) =
1
n
X
o2O
X
o
0
2O
d(o; o
0
):
Proof of Claim 4:
Write
X
o2O
d((o); (O)) =
X
k
X
o2O
d(
k
(o); 
k
(O))
Given the fact that 
k
(o) 2 f0; 1g for each k and o, we can write
d(
k
(o); 
k
(O)) =
X
o
0
2O
1
n
d(
k
(o); 
k
(o
0
))
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Then
X
o2O
d((o); (O)) =
X
k
X
o2O
X
o
0
2O
1
n
d(
k
(o); 
k
(o
0
))
which rearranging, leads to the claimed expression.
Claim 5 Consider any group of objects O with cardinality n and for any attribute k let
n
+
k
= #fo 2 Oj
k
(o) = 1g and let n
 
k
= #fo 2 Oj
k
(o) = 0g. Then
V ar(O) =
2
P
m
k=1
n
+
k
n
 
k
n
:
Proof of Claim 5: By Claim 4,
V ar(O) =
1
n
X
o2O
X
o
0
2O
d(o; o
0
):
Thus, by the additive separability of the city block metric
V ar(O) =
P
k
P
o2O
P
o
0
2O
d(
k
(o); 
k
(o
0
))
n
:
The claim then follows immediately.
Claim 6 If the number of types of objects is at least as large as the number of categories,
then under an optimal categorization, objects of the same type are assigned to the same
category. That is, if (o) = (o
0
), then f

d
(o) = f

d
(o
0
).
Proof of Claim 6: Consider a group of objects O of cardinality n that are all of the
same type. Suppose that a portion Æ 2 [0; 1] of them is in one category and 1   Æ in
another category. The claim can be established by showing that the sum of the two
categories variation is minimized at either Æ = 0 or Æ = 1. (Applying this iteratively then
handles the case where a group of objects of the same type is categorized into more than
two categories.)
Denote the categories by C
1
and C
2
. Let O
i
be the set of objects in C
i
that are not
in O, n
i
be cardinality of O
i
, and d
o
denote the distance between o and an object in O.
Then for a given choice of Æ, by Claim 4 we can write the total variation of categories C
1
and C
2
as
2Æn
P
o2O
1
d
o
+
P
o2O
1
P
o
0
2O
1
d(o; o
0
)
Æn+ n
1
+
2(1  Æ)n
P
o2O
2
d
o
+
P
o2O
2
P
o
0
2O
2
d(o; o
0
)
(1  Æ)n + n
2
:
The derivative of this expression with respect to Æ
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is (after simplifying some terms)
n
"
2n
1
P
o2O
1
d
o
 
P
o2O
1
P
o
0
2O
1
d(o; o
0
)
(Æn+ n
1
)
2
 
2n
2
P
o2O
2
d
o
 
P
o2O
2
P
o
0
2O
2
d(o; o
0
)
((1  Æ)n + n
2
)
2
#
: (9)
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Even though Æ will need to be chosen in multiples of 1=n, we show that the max of this equation
over any Æ 2 [0; 1] is achieved when Æ is at one of the endpoints.
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For any o and o
0
in O
i
, note that by the triangle inequality
d(o; o
0
)  d
o
+ d
o
0
;
with strict inequality when o = o
0
. This implies (after some rearrangement of summa-
tions, and noting that we will have at least one strict inequality) that
2n
i
X
o2O
i
d
o
 
X
o2O
i
X
o
0
2O
i
d(o; o
0
) > 2n
i
X
o2O
i
d
o
  2
X
o2O
i
d
o
= 0: (10)
From the expression for the derivative in (9), it follows that the second derivative of the
total variation is
 2n
2
2
6
4
(Æn+ n
1
)
2n
1
P
o2O
1
d
o
 
P
o2O
1
P
o
0
2O
1
d(o;o
0
)
(Æn+n
1
)
3
+((1  Æ)n+ n
2
)
2n
2
P
o2O
2
d
o
 
P
o2O
2
P
o
0
2O
2
d(o;o
0
)
((1 Æ)n+n
2
)
3
3
7
5
: (11)
By the inequality (10), the second derivative is negative. This implies that the total
variation is strictly concave in Æ, and so the minimum over Æ 2 [0; 1] must then be
achieved at an endpoint of the interval.
Given Claim 6, we can think of the categorization of objects in terms of which types
('s) are assigned to which category. The following claim is also useful. Say that two
attribute vectors are adjacent if they dier in terms of one and only one attribute.
Claim 7 If n >
7
8
2
m
, and some majority type does not get its own unique category, then
there exist (at least) two minority types that are adjacent to each other and each get their
own category.
Proof of Claim 7: We use the following fact. If a hypercube has 2
x
vertices, then any
subset of more than 2
x 1
vertices contains at least two that are adjacent.
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If n >
7
8
2
m
  1 (collecting the terms 2
m 1
+ 2
m 2
+ 2
m 3
), and not every majority
item gets its own category, then minority items occupy more than
3
8
2
m
categories which
have no majority items in them. This means that more than half of the minority objects
are in categories that have only one type of object in it. The claim then follows from the
fact mentioned above.
Now, let us return to the proof of the theorems.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose that
28
It is easily checked that this bound is tight - that is, one can always nd a subset of exactly 2
x 1
vertices such that no two are adjacent.
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1n
1
+
1
n
2
>
h
n
A
+
h
n
B
:
We need to show that
V ar(O
A
[ O
B
) + V ar(O
1
) + V ar(O
2
) > V ar(O
1
[O
2
) + V ar(O
A
) + V ar(O
B
):
Note that since O
1
and O
2
are homogeneous, this amounts to showing that
V ar(O
A
[O
B
) > V ar(O
1
[ O
2
) + V ar(O
A
) + V ar(O
B
):
Letting n
A+
k
, n
A 
k
, have the obvious meanings (as in Claim 4), Claim 5 implies that this
boils down to showing that
2
P
k
(n
A+
k
+ n
B+
k
)(n
A 
k
+ n
B 
k
)
n
A
+ n
B
>
2
P
k
(n
1+
k
+ n
2+
k
)(n
1 
k
+ n
2 
k
)
n
1
+ n
2
(12)
+
2
P
k
(n
A+
k
)(n
A 
k
)
n
A
+
2
P
k
(n
B+
k
)(n
B 
k
)
n
B
: (13)
Since O
1
and O
2
are homogeneous, it follows that
2
P
k
(n
1+
k
+ n
2+
k
)(n
1 
k
+ n
2 
k
)
n
1
+ n
2
=
2hn
1
n
2
n
1
+ n
2
:
Thus, inequality (12) simplies to
2
P
k
(n
A+
k
+ n
B+
k
)(n
A 
k
+ n
B 
k
)
n
A
+ n
B
>
2hn
1
n
2
n
1
+ n
2
+
2
P
k
(n
A+
k
)(n
A 
k
)
n
A
+
2
P
k
(n
B+
k
)(n
B 
k
)
n
B
: (14)
Cross multiplication, some cancelling of terms, and factoring allows us to rewrite (14) as
X
k
(n
A+
k
n
B 
k
  n
A 
k
n
B+
k
)
2
>
hn
1
n
2
n
A
n
B
(n
A
+ n
B
)
n
1
+ n
2
: (15)
Given that O
A
and O
B
form an eÆcient splitting of O
3
we know that for the eÆcient
splitting k with respect to which O
A
and O
B
are dened,
(n
A+
k
n
B 
k
  n
A 
k
n
B+
k
)
2
= 1:
Thus to show (15), it is enough to show that
1 >
hn
1
n
2
n
A
n
B
(n
A
+ n
B
)
n
1
+ n
2
:
Note that this is equivalent to
1
n
1
+
1
n
2
>
h
n
A
+
h
n
B
;
which is our supposition.
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Proof of Theorem 2: We need to show that
h
34
n
1
+
h
34
n
2
>
h
12
n
3
+
h
12
n
4
if and only if
V ar(O
1
[)
2
) < V ar(O
3
[)
4
):
Following the proof of theorem 1, we can rewrite
V ar(O
1
[)
2
) < V ar(O
3
[)
4
)
as
2h
12
n
1
n
2
n
1
+ n
2
<
2h
34
n
3
n
4
n
3
+ n
4
:
This can be rewritten as
h
34
n
1
+
h
34
n
2
>
h
12
n
3
+
h
12
n
4
which is the claimed expression.
Proof of Corollary 3 : We establish the theorem by showing that each of the majority
types gets its own unique category. That is, if 
k
(o) = 1 and f

d
(o) = f

d
(o
0
), then
(o) = (o
0
).
Consider some f such that 
k
(o) = 1 and f(o) = f(o
0
), and yet (o) 6= (o
0
). We need
only show that such an f is not a solution to f

d
(o) = f

d
(o
0
).
By Claims 6 and 7, if some majority type does not get its own category we know that
there are at least two adjacent minority types that are assigned to their own categories.
Let the types of the two adjacent minority types be denoted 
1
and 
2
, and the majority
type be 
3
, and denote the corresponding groups of objects by O
1
, O
2
, and O
3
with
corresponding cardinalities n
1
, n
2
, and n
3
. Let O
4
be set of the remaining objects that
are in the same category as O
3
. By the adjacency of O
1
and O
2
, by Theorem 1, it is
enough to show that
1
n
1
+
1
n
2
>
1
n
A
+
1
n
B
;
where n
A
and n
B
correspond to an eÆcient splitting of O
3
[ O
4
. Note that by the
denition of eÆcient splitting it follows that
1
n
A
+
1
n
B

1
n
3
+
1
n
4
:
Thus, we need to show that
1
n
1
+
1
n
2
>
1
n
3
+
1
n
4
:
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Without loss of generality, assume that n
1
 n
2
. Then it is suÆcient to check that
2
n
1
>
1
n
3
+
1
n
4
;
or
2n
3
n
1
 
n
3
n
4
> 1:
Noting that
n
3
n
1
> r
E
, and
n
3
n
4
< r
E
r
I
then leads to the claimed inequality.
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